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Abstract
This case features TradeCard Inc., a New York-based financial supply chain service
provider, and its plan to expand into the China market. The case discusses how a
structured B2B online payment system such as TradeCard can be marketed in China and
how TradeCard Inc. can create a critical mass of users in China.

1.

Introduction

TradeCard Inc. (www.tradecard.com) developed TradeCard as a financial supply chain
service. The TradeCard platform aligned the documentary and financial requirements of
a domestic or international trade transaction with the physical movement of goods,
eliminating time-consuming and error-prone manual processes. By streamlining and
enhancing the steps necessary for purchase order approvals, payment decisions and
settlement, TradeCard provided a cost-effective, practical and patented service for
financial supply chain management. When TradeCard Inc. started in February 1999,
some of the challenges the Company faced involved building the network of players and
service providers in the TradeCard system, changing the mindset of global traders who
conducted large-dollar transactions to use TradeCard, and building a technical
infrastructure that had the ability to provide a seamless online settlement transaction and
secure electronic solution involving a network of global players. TradeCard expanded
rapidly after 1999. By the end of 2002, TradeCard had attracted over 100 service
providers in the TradeCard system and over 600 companies were using TradeCard. The
Company improved the service offering by “unbundling” solutions to fit the special and
customised needs of its customers.
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New York-based TradeCard Inc. had offices in San Diego, San Francisco and Chicago,
and international offices in Hong Kong, Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei.1 In November 2002
TradeCard Inc. decided to enter China. Not only was China considered to be the biggest
market in the world, but most of TradeCard’s biggest customers in the US, Europe, Hong
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and around the region had their products manufactured in the
mainland. With China’s accession to the WTO, foreign companies, including TradeCard
Inc., were eyeing China as a very attractive market. However, China had yet to develop
its legal, financial and technological infrastructure to accommodate international players.
How then could a structured B2B online trade transaction management service such as
TradeCard be marketed to China? How could TradeCard Inc. create a critical mass of
users in the China region? What would be the best means to achieve that?

2.

TradeCard in 1999-2002

TradeCard Inc. went through three major phases after its inception in early 1999:
developing the product; developing the platform, and then unbundling the solution. [see
Figure 1 for TradeCard’s history and highlights].
The product – TradeCard – was basically a Web-enabled service designed and developed
by TradeCard Inc. as a robust payment alternative for large-dollar, cross-border and
credit-assured transactions. TradeCard started as a Letter-of-Credit replacement product
in February 1999. TradeCard’s design was intended to be scalable, secure and Webbased. It was a B2B e-commerce infrastructure provider that enabled buyers and sellers
to initiate, conduct and settle international trade transactions securely over the Internet.
TradeCard aggregated buyers, sellers and disparate trade service providers in an
automated and streamlined environment, which made trade more secure, reliable, costeffective and user-friendly. In this first phase the pricing model was simple: all
transactions cost US$150.
The second phase occurred between January 2001 and August 2002, when TradeCard
expanded the platform. TradeCard had become a transaction management platform
wherein the product included multiple payment options for large-dollar or small-dollar,
cross-border or domestic, and credit-assured or open-account transactions. In April 200l
TradeCard introduced its wholesale model, providing financial institutions with the
opportunity to license a “white label” version of the platform. White label was a version
of the platform that was sold by financial institutions to their customers as a hosted
solution with a customised user interface, transaction options and pricing. TradeCard
also introduced a new flexible pricing concept, meaning that members paid only for the
functionality they used. At this stage TradeCard’s service provider network – consisting
of logistics, inspection, financial institutions, credit and insurance services, etc. –
continued to grow, and the new strategy was validated by increased transaction volumes
and member acquisition rates.
The third phase, “unbundling” the solution, began in the fourth quarter of 2002.
TradeCard began unbundling the platform to provide a more flexible solution to its
customers. TradeCard had become a modular financial supply chain solution. The
modular solution had multiple sales and pricing options (subscription, basis points, etc.)
that could be customised based on the target market. The complete solution included

1 TradeCard was available for buyers in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Norway,
the Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
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financial services, document management and presentation distribution. The product
enabled documents to be routed and managed internally (within the organisation) and
externally (with buyers and suppliers), and members were able to send and receive
documents to and from non-members.

3.

TradeCard Customer Profile

TradeCard served global businesses in a variety of industries and countries. Its customer
base was focused on companies importing and exporting apparel, footwear, electronics,
houseware and other finished goods between the United States and Asia. Many of
TradeCard’s customers were involved in importing and exporting goods between North
America, Europe and Asia.
From a sales point of view, TradeCard was highly focused on who it sold to on the buy
side. TradeCard focused on the following:
1. Prospects were segmented based on the amount of purchasing a buyer would do,
because the more purchasing a buyer conducted the more value TradeCard could
provide for them. Hence TradeCard wanted to target big companies, such as WalMart. “They could pay us a lot of money and using TradeCard still allows them to
save even more,” Mr. Kurt Cavano, TradeCard Inc. Chairman and CEO, said.
2. TradeCard also focused on vertical markets – footwear, clothing, apparel, consumer
electronics and toys. According to Cavano, there were two ways for small companies
to die: starve on not enough opportunity or drown on too much. “We’re passed the
starvation phase but if we’re not careful we could be drowning on too much. So
focus is a key word,” said Cavano.

4.

Marketing and Sales

Despite a challenging economic environment, including the technology sector’s crash in
2000, TradeCard revenues increased at a growth rate of over 15 per cent per month on
average in 2002 and purchase orders initiated through the TradeCard system showed
monthly increases of 40 per cent over the last quarter of 2002. Transaction volumes had
increased tenfold over the previous year.
TradeCard corporate membership was around 600, including five of the largest US
retailers, the two largest Japanese trading companies, two of the largest Korean chaebols
and several of the world’s largest footwear, apparel and toy companies.
TradeCard’s integrated trade services network consisted of over 100 logistics providers,
15 global financial institutions, the top three inspection services (Bureau Veritas,
Inspectorate and SGS), the leading provider of export credit insurance (Coface), GE
Commercial Services (a unit of GE Commercial Finance and a well known player in the
factoring industry), and the largest broker of cargo insurance (Marsh McLennan).

5.

TradeCard Product Improvement: The Modular Platform

The TradeCard system provided an alternative to traditional expensive, paper-based and
labour-intensive trade settlement methods that required buyers and sellers to operate
offline. TradeCard was a Web-enabled platform that all parties accessed through the
Internet by logging into its secure transaction environment. TradeCard’s patented data
compliance engine checked that the actual shipment data matched the original purchase
3
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order data agreed upon by the buyer and seller. Once data compliance was met, funds
were electronically transferred from the buyer’s account to the seller’s account, allowing
the entire transaction to be handled and settled online.
hen TradeCard started in 1999, the TradeCard system required member companies to
follow the complete transaction cycle, starting with purchase order execution with trading
partners, moving on to matching and compliance, and completing the transaction with
financial settlement.2 Customer feedback indicated that some preferred to go with the
whole transaction, while others wanted just a piece of the process. TradeCard realised
that significant value could be achieved by separating the individual components of
functionality and enabling both buyer and seller to use these as they needed. Commented
Cavano:
“Unbundling the TradeCard platform is a classic example of listening to
your customers. They asked to use our technology in additional ways we
didn’t anticipate and we listened. We now provide them the flexibility to
use TradeCard in the areas of their business that cause the most pain and
where there are gaps in their current technology that need to be
addressed.”
On 16 December 2002, TradeCard announced the new modularised TradeCard platform.
This flexible modular product offering enabled customers to use selected features on the
global trade transaction from purchase order to financial settlement. For example,
customers were then able to target areas of value such as creating a worldwide purchase
order (PO) portal to initiate, exchange and collaborate with their trading partners or
implement financial settlement with or without payment protection guarantees. In
addition to the full transaction management function, the TradeCard system was offered
with the three layers, namely connectivity and document management; payment
management, and financial services network [see Figure 2].
1. Connectivity Document Management – POs were distributed electronically to
trading partners. The buyer would create and send POs to TradeCard through a
standard EDI or ERP or MS Excel spreadsheet – whichever method they wanted.
(Small buyers could key in through a browser, especially when there was no
sophisticated data involved.) Once TradeCard received the POs, TradeCard would
then send them to all vendors or sellers. Sellers were allowed to view the POs,
download the information and print them. Sellers would notify TradeCard, and
therefore the buyers, of receipt of POs. Gathering of data and amendments to data
were all done electronically [see Figure 3].

2 A full service-transaction-plus-money-movement process involved the following: The buyer creates and
sends a purchase order (PO) through their EDI, ERP or user interfaces on their Internet browser into the
TradeCard system. The seller receives an automatic e-mail notice from the TradeCard system informing him
that a PO is pending. The seller then approves the PO or negotiates the terms with the buyer if necessary.
After approval by the seller the PO is stored in the TradeCard system. At this point in the transaction, the
seller can select payment assurance if required. Once the goods are ready for shipment, the seller creates an
invoice and packing list through the TradeCard system. Since most of the invoice data are found on the
original PO, the TradeCard system automatically pre-postulates the invoice document, so that the seller only
needs to fill in additional data.
TradeCard’s patented compliance engine then matches the invoice and other optional documents such as the
packing list, proof of delivery and proof of inspection against the PO. Both buyer and seller are notified if
there are any discrepancies and have the option of negotiating them free of charge online. Once discrepancies
have been resolved, payment instructions are either triggered automatically and instructions are sent to JP
Morgan Chase to debit the buyer’s account and credit the seller’s account, or the buyer issues a Payment
Authorisation Document specifying the amount and time of the payment to be made.
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This layer of the TradeCard system allowed non-TradeCard members to trade with
TradeCard members through the purchase order portal, where receiving and
acknowledging POs was done. Having access to the Internet was the only requirement
for non-TradeCard members.
2. Payment Management – This involved purchase order management, document
management, workflow management and data compliance.
Here, payment
decisioning and payment scheduling were key. TradeCard had a patented data
compliance engine that compared procurement and fulfillment documents to drive
payment decisions [see Figure 4].
3. Financial Services – Buyers and sellers had access to domestic or international
money movement, assurance of payment and trade financing through TradeCard’s
extensive network of financial institutions [see Figure 5].
This modular solution allowed TradeCard to sell to companies that it had not sold to
before, particularly those that were already using some of the layers. Furthermore,
TradeCard was able to better articulate the value of each layer to companies. By breaking
the platform into layers, TradeCard was also able to change its pricing. Pricing had
previously been based on transactions, but in early 2001 the price changed to modular
layers – purchase order portal, full transaction management, full transaction management
plus money movement, or full transaction management plus full financial services. To be
a TradeCard member, a company had to pay a one-time initiation fee of US$250.
Thereafter, payments of US$150 per transaction of up to US$50,000 were required.

6.

The China Market
“We simply had to have a presence in China. Our processing volume in
the region grew by approximately 1,000 per cent last year and that was
just goods manufactured in China by Hong Kong and Taiwan
headquartered companies. And as China’s economy is opening up to the
world as part of the WTO agreement, we see a great opportunity here to
help PRC-based companies automate their supply chains fast.”
-

6.1

Mr. Kurt Cavano, TradeCard Inc., Chairman and CEO (Anonymous, 2003)

Issues and Challenges in the China Market
“Marketing in China is different as we must be sensitive to the strict
regulations for banking, trade and foreign exchange.”
-

Mr. Robert Lin, Vice President Business Development, TradeCard Asia
Pacific Limited (Hong Kong, June 2003)

Most of TradeCard’s US-based buyer members, such as Wolverine World Wide
(producer of Hush Puppy shoes), International Playthings and JC Penney, sourced and
manufactured their goods in China and used the TradeCard platform to manage their
transactions from purchase order to payment through their vendors based in locations
such as Hong Kong and Taiwan. TradeCard wanted to target companies in China, to
persuade them to automate their supply chain using the TradeCard platform. However,
China had only started to embrace B2B integration through technology by the third
quarter of 2002. At the same time, China’s foreign currency regulations and the heavily
regulated insurance market posed a temporary obstacle to TradeCard’s plan to serve
5

Ali F. Farhoomand

China-based companies. These local regulations were compounded by the fact that very
few foreign banking and insurance institutions were able to operate in China.
The payment protection type of service that TradeCard offered to its clients was classified
in China as a type of insurance. The ability of foreign insurance companies to operate in
China was highly restricted. Thus, TradeCard partners - such as Coface and GE – had yet
to acquire the insurance licences to allow TradeCard to offer a payment protection service
in China.
Another problem that was difficult to overcome in China was the lack of central agency
for managing credit ratings. TradeCard was able to operate as a facilitator and automator
of trade processes and was able to perform financial movements in China. Nevertheless,
TradeCard was limited in the types of credit and credit protection that its partners
traditionally provided to its clients in other markets. For example, China-based exporters
wanted payment protection on their transactions through TradeCard. Although
TradeCard’s partners were able to provide payment protection for exporters in Hong
Kong and Taiwan, the regulations in China forbade this. On the other hand, foreign
sellers of goods to China also wanted to receive payment protection on their transactions
through TradeCard. Credit ratings and the ability to perform independent due diligence
to establish credit in China were still in the early stages of development. Hence,
TradeCard’s partners were often unable to establish a credit rating for a buyer in China.
In addition, the avenues for legal recourse in China were poorly developed. For example,
if by chance a buyer wired funds incorrectly to a seller’s account, the buyer could not
simply request the funds back. It was likely that the buyer would have to go through the
legal system, and even then, there was no guarantee that the procedure would be
successful.
Faced with these issues, TradeCard was in the process of working on a solution to the
payment protection issue, and said that it was likely to start offering its full portfolio of
services to Chinese exporters by the last quarter of 2003. Lin also believed that
TradeCard would find solutions to overcome many of the issues in China. Lin added that
as with any developing market, China’s financial and legal systems were improving. For
the time being, TradeCard was focusing on exports coming out of Guangdong and Fujian,
which were operated by Hong Kong- and Taiwanese-based companies where credit and
payment protection were being extended to non-mainland entities. TradeCard said that
the sheer volume of these exports provided more than enough business opportunities for
TradeCard.
6.2

The State of China’s Electronic B2B

In August 2002, Xinhua News Agency reported that China’s electronic B2B market was
still in its infancy, though growth was rapid. Statistics from the China Centre for
Information Industry Department (CCID) in 2001 showed that the volume of business of
electronic B2Bs reached US$12.95 billion, up 40 per cent from US$9.2 billion in 2000
(Xinhua, 2002) [see Figure 6 for breakdown of some industries].
With regards to B2B Websites in operation, China had 667 Websites by the end of 2001 –
72 were for companies with multiple businesses and the other 595 were for companies
that operated a single business. Some other B2B Websites were exclusive to enterprise
partners. Most trading companies’ Websites only provided the latest information, but did
not allow online transactions.
Up to the second quarter of 2002, only 22.3 per cent of Chinese enterprises had been
involved in electronic business. Among these online enterprises, 70 per cent used the Net
to search for or publish information, one third were capable of online payment, and one
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seventh had made purchases through the Internet. However, there was no B2B site in
China that covered most business types, leaving great opportunities for electronic
business development (Xinhua, 2002).
Panelists at CeBIT Asia 2002’s B2B Growth in China conference expressed doubt as to
the validity of B2B projections but indicated B2B in China would be a success, so long as
certain issues were addressed. Panelists said there was a need to improve the legislative
framework to overcome potential security problems.
Although China still had some work to do before B2B could become widely accepted,
there were several players making inroads. Sparkice.com, a B2B e-commerce network
that had a trading platform that facilitated the procurement of consumer products from
Chinese manufacturers, was one of those players in China.3 Sparkice’s Vice President
Sales, Mr. Sean Young, said players needed to have a good understanding of the local
market before launch. “Otherwise it’s impossible to have a successful solution,” he said
(Nicholas, 2002). Young also said it was believed that by 2004, 70 per cent of enterprises
in China would have a B2B model; however China’s 10 million or so small businesses
would probably need local government help getting there.
On the Chinese government side, the Director-General of the Department of Information
Promotion, Ms. Song Ling, said the government had to do more work on the macroeconomic environment, leaving businesses to build infrastructure. Ling added that the
government could perhaps offer tax incentives that would ensure the security of customer
information and financial details.
A Gartner report, however, warned against equating security requirements with online
trust. The report said: “Authenticating users or Websites and ensuring the confidentiality
and validity of online interactions form an essential foundation … but business trust also
encompasses the non-technical issues surrounding commerce between enterprises.
Sufficient trust must be established for any relationship to deliver the desired business
value” (Nicholas, 2002).

7.

TradeCard’s Marketing Strategy in China

Asked about TradeCard’s goal, Cavano said:
“One thousand per cent growth in the Asia-Pacific. If you don’t set high
goals you don’t have high success. It’s very doable.”
In January 2003, TradeCard announced it was opening its first representative office in
China, to be located in the Shenzhen Special Economy Zone. “We simply had to have a
presence in China. Our processing volume in the region grew by approximately 1,000
per cent last year and that was just goods manufactured in China by Hong Kong and
Taiwan headquartered companies,” said Cavano (Asia Pulse, 2003). Cavano also
mentioned that TradeCard picked Shenzhen because it was in the Guangdong region,
where a third of Chinese exports come from.
Of the 600 companies that had signed up with TradeCard, about two-thirds had
businesses in Asia – a split between Hong Kong and Taiwan – and almost half had
factories in China.

3 Sparkice.com launched China’s first Internet café in November 1996. Since then, it has transformed into a
B2B e-commerce network.
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7.1

“Viral” Marketing Strategy

When asked about TradeCard’s marketing strategy in China, Cavano explained:
Our strategy in China is really simple. …We’re going after the big
buyers in the US and Europe who manufacture in China and we’re
getting them to bring us to the companies in China. We’re not going to
exporters in China and saying, “You should use TradeCard”. We’re
going to the big buyers that buy from those companies and have them say
to their suppliers, “This is our recommendation to how you should do
it”. Very few of them would compel the companies to use it but most of
them will highly recommend it. Then based on that we typically get a
letter or email from a TradeCard member saying, “This is how we would
like to do this transaction. Meet with a TradeCard representative.”
Then we go and meet with those companies and bring it together. And
we found that to be extremely effective for us.
Mr. Cavano likened the approach to the “viral” marketing strategy.4 He said that while
other marketing activities required segmenting the market and identifying the segment
that a company would want to get into, TradeCard’s approach of getting referrals from
existing TradeCard users was more directed. It was ideal for TradeCard to market its
services through the buyers, or the companies that TradeCard were dealing with, because
they had already experienced the benefits and the value of using the TradeCard system.
TradeCard would request a listing of the major sellers that their buyers dealt with and
would then make a direct marketing approach to those referrals [see Figure 7].
7.2

Continuous Education to Create Market Awareness

Another way TradeCard worked with its members who were buyers was by running joint
seminars to educate the vendors. The buyer company would invite vendors to the
seminar. Then TradeCard would follow up with individual companies by calling them.
One of the main challenges of TradeCard Inc. when it started in 1999 was getting people
to change the way they did business. At that time, doing transactions over the Internet
was perceived to be unsafe. Hence, TradeCard had to put a lot of effort into educating its
prospective customers. In China, TradeCard intended to continue its education
campaigns. While it was a challenge educating people about TradeCard in 1999, Cavano
said the education process was getting easier after a couple of years.
Mr. Cavano emphasised that TradeCard was not an Internet company; it was merely
using the Internet as a vehicle for moving the data around. “We’re actually a software
company. We just happen to use the Internet as a vehicle,” he added.
7.3

Build Alliances with Government Representatives,
Trading Companies and Institutions

The business approach in China would be the same as in all countries: to forge alliances
with established local trading companies or institutions that had developed strong links

4 Viral marketing was a term often used in online marketing. Wilson (2000) defined viral
marketing as “any strategy that encourages individuals to pass on a marketing message to others,
creating the potential for exponential growth in the message’s exposure and influence.”
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with the local community. These alliances would serve as TradeCard’s main sales force
on the ground. Marketing of the TradeCard service would therefore be through
companies and institutions that understood trading practices and had an established
database of traders, which was a similar relationship that TradeCard had with Tradelink
in Hong Kong. Tradelink was a joint venture between the Hong Kong Government and
11 private sector shareholders that served as the local “electronic gateway” for the Hong
Kong trading community. It had 43,000 customers. Tradelink came up with a direct
marketing programme to promote TradeCard as a new international trade settlement tool
to the Hong Kong trading community.5
In China, participation from government representatives at most
conferences is involved so that all parties may better understand the
services provided by TradeCard. At the same time, it is important for us
to stay up to date with developments in government policy and also to
work with government in China to help expand our business in China.
- Robert Lin, Vice President Business Development, TradeCard Asia Pacific
Limited.

8.

TradeCard’s Proposition

TradeCard’s solutions were ideal for businesses seeking to reduce costs and add
efficiency to their procurement and fulfilment processes. TradeCard offered a new view
of the supply chain by focusing on the financial data and documents that businesses
needed in order to make informed payment decisions. TradeCard provided a good
opportunity for businesses seeking significant improvements in the following areas:
•

More efficient procurement/payable processes and/or fulfillment/ receivables
processes

•

Reduction in Days Sales Outstanding (DSO) and increased cashflow predictability

•

Payment cycle standardisation

•

Reduction in credit facilities

•

Improved document management and data quality

•

Lower infrastructure costs over time

TradeCard had a very flexible approach to implementation. There was no major upfront
investment or software to purchase and no expensive hardware to install; the TradeCard
platform was accessible through a Web-browser. The majority of TradeCard customers
integrated their ERP/SCM Order Generation system with the TradeCard platform and
were able to select out-of-the-box fast-start or customised integration solutions.
Implementation of TradeCard with buyers occurred within an average of four to eight
weeks, including implementation, training and process changes. With sellers, the
implementation was quicker – half a day or four hours – which meant that customers
could start benefiting as soon as they joined TradeCard.

5 Tradelink, an established institution, had the market penetration for international trade, which mirrored the
TradeCard model.
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According to Cavano the overall transactions market was huge, but in an economic
downturn, there were sizeable potential savings in settlement fees and costs for a
corporation.
The TradeCard system offered value to both the buyers and sellers and they shared the
costs: buyers had to buy into the subscription model to use the software, while sellers
paid transaction fees. Cavano added:
“We work really hard because there are two things that need to happen
for us to be successful: people have to trust us and we have to keep the
system reliable.”
Industry experts acknowledged TradeCard for its continued efforts to improve its
technology and service, particularly in safeguarding customer confidential information.
In January 2002, TradeCard became the first US company to receive the WebTrust
Confidentiality Seal. TradeCard also earned the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants or AICPA’s SysTrust certification for system reliability, covering the
SysTrust principles of security, availability, integrity and maintainability of a system,
following a separate Ernst & Young evaluation (Anonymous, 2002).

9.

The Challenge

Cavano believed that the China market was no different from anywhere else in the world.
Nevertheless, he said the main challenge for TradeCard was to understand what the
geography would require in the future. Cavano was confident that TradeCard would
reach its goal in Asia Pacific – 1,000 per cent growth – by using a simple marketing
strategy of working closely with their existing members, in particular US-based
companies, to lead them to China vendors or exporters.
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•

1994 – The World Trade Centers Association (WTCA) conceived of TradeCard.

•

1997 – TradeCard was formally established as an independent company.

•

1998 – TradeCard was issued US patent number 5,717,989 for its data compliance
and financial settlement engine.

•

February 1999 – TradeCard, Inc. received a private equity commitment from
Warburg Pincus & Co. and Kurt Cavano was named CEO of the Company.

•

November 1999 – TradeCard begun transaction services.

•

January 2000 – TradeCard was issued Taiwanese patent number 107,368 for its
compliance and financial settlement engine.

•

April 2000 – TradeCard officially launched commercial services.

•

November 2000 – TradeCard was issued an additional US patent, number
6,151,588, for its data compliance and settlement engine.

•

March 2001 – TradeCard launched a single platform for financial supply chain
automation with settlement for domestic and cross-border transactions.

•

April 2001 – TradeCard introduced its wholesale model, providing financial
institutions with the opportunity to license a “white-label” version of the platform
and offer the solution to their customers.

•

September 2001 – TradeCard received US$25 million in funding from Warburg
Pincus & Co.

•

April 2002 – TradeCard was issued an additional Taiwanese patent, number
146,500, for its data compliance and settlement engine. TradeCard offered its
Financial Supply Chain platform as a hosted “White Label” solution with a
customised user interface, transaction options and pricing.

•

October 2002 – TradeCard receives an additional US$10 million in funding from
Warburg Pincus & Co.

•

April 2003 – The Singapore Registrar of Patents issued a Certificate of Grant of
Patent to TradeCard for its data compliance and settlement engine.

Figure 1: TradeCard Highlights
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CONNECTIVITY

A secure connection between a buyer and its
trading community to support message-based or
browser-based communications.

Purchase Order Management. Ability to deliver
purchase orders, receive acknowledgements and
amend purchase orders.

DOCUMENT
MANAGEMENT

Shipping Documents. Access to all transaction
data in real time for the lifetime of the transaction
in a collaborative, online environment.

Workflow and Event Management. Ability to
move tasks throughout the enterprise and realtime notification of supply chain events.

PAYMENT
MANAGEMENT

Payment Decisioning and Payment Scheduling.
A patented data compliance engine compares
procurement and fulfilment documents to drive
payment decisions.

FINANCIAL
SERVICES
NETWORK

Access to money movement, assurance of
payment and trade financing through an
extensive network of financial institutions.

Figure 2: TradeCard Core Functionality
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1

Buyer

Notify of receipt of
purchase order
Purchase order
approved and
stored

2

Seller

Create and send
purchase order (UI,
EDI, ERP interfaces)

TradeCard Transaction
Management Engine
Purchase Order Management

Figure 3: Purchase Order Delivery: Fully Integrated to Internal Systems and/or Simple
Internet Access

Figure 4: Full Transaction Management plus Money Management
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Figure 5: Full Transaction Management plus Financial Services

Home electrical appliances

> US$2.53 billion

Petroleum industry

US$1.99 billion

Information industry, textile and garments, and
light industry

> US$1.2 billion

Figure 6: Volume of business of electronic B2B in China in 2001 (Xinhua, 2002)
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